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ESSAY
LOBBYISTS AS IMPERFECT AGENTS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
IN A PLURALIST SYSTEM*
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON‡ & HOWELL E. JACKSON†
Interest group pluralism presumes that public policy outcomes are determined
principally through a contest for influence among organized pressure groups.
Most interest groups, however, do not represent themselves in this process.
Rather, they rely on professional lobbyists for representation, information, and
advice. These lobbyists, however, may have their own interests, which may not
align perfectly with those of their clients. This Essay outlines this principal-
agent problem and suggests its possible implications for policy outcomes. In
particular, this piece hypothesizes that the lobbyist-client agency problem may
create four notable consequences: (1) it may bias policy in favor of small ho-
mogenous groups; (2) it may exacerbate status quo bias; (3) it may promote
expansive delegations of power and rulemaking to administrative agencies; and
(4) it may impede systematic reforms to the policymaking process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dominant framework for understanding public policymaking in the
United States is interest group pluralism.1 According to the pluralist view,
the best way to explain and predict policy outcomes is to focus on the many
organized groups jostling to advance their interests through government ac-
tion.2 A robust theoretical, empirical, and normative debate exists over
*The authors are grateful to Gabriella Blum, Glenn Cohen, Jake Gersen, Daryl Levinson,
A.G. Newmyer, Jeff Pojanowski, Ben Roin, Ben Sachs, Jed Shugerman, Tom Susman, and
Judge Stephen Williams for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
‡Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School.
†J ames S. Reid, Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITI-
CAL INTRODUCTION 12–15 (1991).
2 Classic statements of the pluralist perspective on policymaking include ARTHUR F.
BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES (1908); JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON T ULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC T HEORY (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY
AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A
STUDY IN BASING-POINT REGULATION (1952); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PRO-
CESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951). More recent treatments of interest
group pluralism in political science and law include JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP
SOCIETY (2d ed. 1989); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND A MERICAN D EMOCRACY (1986); Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger,
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 89 (1986); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Pub-
lic Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); William C. Mitchell
& Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM.\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 2 19-JAN-10 8:57
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whether this sort of interest group pluralism is good or bad. While critics
fear that interest group pluralism leads to unjust or inefficient outcomes,3
more optimistic observers believe that pluralism, despite its flaws, produces
reasonably good public policy most of the time.4 Both defenders of pluralism
and its critics, however, generally share an implicit belief that each group
zealously advocates for whatever policies would best advance its own inter-
ests.5 While this is a useful first approximation, it overlooks the fact that
interest groups usually rely on professional lobbyists to represent them in the
political process.6 The relationship between an interest group and its lobby-
ists is therefore vulnerable to the kinds of problems common between any
principals and agents. These agency problems may distort the policymaking
process in ways that lead to outcomes that differ from those that would pre-
vail under “pure” interest group pluralism, where the aims of the interest
groups fully determine their lobbyists’ actions.
The existing literature has noted the potential agency problem between
lobbyists and their clients.7 This issue has not, however, received the atten-
J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985). Although this literature focuses principally on the United States, interest
group (or “stakeholder”) theories of policymaking have also been applied, often with consid-
erable success, in other contexts. See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & FRANS STOKMAN, EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING (1994); BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., RED FLAG
OVER HONG KONG (1986).
3 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 2; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE R
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 22 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
4 See Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public
Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1999 (1988); Donald Wittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL.
ECON. 1395 (1989).
5 Compare BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 2, at 78, with DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO- R
CRATIC THEORY, supra note 2, at 15. R
6 See, e.g., Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 89 (1995).
7 The most sustained analysis of this lobbyist-client agency problem is Rogan Kersh, State
Autonomy & Civil Society: The Lobbyist Connection, 14 CRITICAL R EV. 237 (2000). Kersh
emphasizes that lobbyists are not mere “transmission belts” who represent their clients’ inter-
ests in the legislative process; rather, he points out, lobbyists have their own interests—both
material and with respect to public policy—that may differ from those of their clients. The
current analysis differs from Kersh’s in that Kersh’s principal interest is in the implications of
lobbyist autonomy for theories of state autonomy and civil society, whereas this Essay is inter-
ested primarily in whether lobbyist-client agency slack may have systematic consequences for
public policy. On this question, the legal literature contains numerous scattered references to
how the divergence between lobbyist interests and client interests may affect policy outcomes,
but little sustained attention. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default
Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 676 (2004) (suggesting that a client-lobbyist agency
problem explains why groups fail to object when a statute is incomplete and shifts responsibil-
ity to courts or administrative agencies); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporat-
ing the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61–62 & n.174 (1998) (discussing the\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-JAN-10 8:57
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tion it deserves. This lack of sustained analysis of agency problems in the
lobbying context is surprising, given the rich and sophisticated literature that
considers analogous agency problems between lawyers and their clients.8
possibility that environmental and consumer advocacy groups represent the interests of their
leadership rather than the interests of their members or the public at large); Clayton P. Gillette,
Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 201–03 (1996)
(claiming, in general, that an agency problem means interest group leaders will sometimes
push legislation that benefits the leaders more than their constituents, perhaps by focusing on
securing visible and popular benefits at the expense of less salient but more important bene-
fits); Michael S. Greve, Business, the States, and Federalism’s Political Economy, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 895, 922 (2002) (arguing that a principal-agent problem between lobbyists
and their constituents may explain why both environmentalists and the business community
might prefer a federal permitting program to a decentralized, state-level regulatory system,
even if the latter would be better both for business and the environment); Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25 (1991) (arguing that the resistance of industry lobbyists to market-
based environmental regulations stems, in part, from a principal-agent problem because the
lobbyists fear changes to the status quo that would diminish the value of their expertise, even if
these changes would benefit their clients); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seek-
ing, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 931–32 & n.103 (1997) (arguing that
an agency problem between non-profit broadcasters and their lobbyists explains why non-
profits supported the licensing scheme adopted by the 1927 Radio Act, even though it was not
in their interest); Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1652–54 (1999) (observing that although citizens can make use of “super-
agents,” including organized interest groups, to monitor their political representatives, these
superagents might themselves be subject to agency problems); Nathaniel O. Keohane et al.,
The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313,
332–33 (1998) (asserting that a principal-agent problem exists between an interest group’s
members and the professional staff who engage in lobbying activities); Manik Roy, Pollution
Prevention, Organizational Culture, and Social Learning, 22 ENVTL. L. 189, 205 (1992) (ob-
serving, in a case study of an environmental advocacy group, that the group’s lobbyist had
tremendous discretion and independence from the group’s contributors); Henry A. Span, Pub-
lic Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 35
n.101 (2003) (noting that lobbyists claiming to represent diffuse groups may exhibit an agency
problem); Nathan Witkin, Interest Group Mediation: A Mechanism for Controlling and Im-
proving Congressional Lobbying Practices, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON  DISP. RESOL. 373, 402 & n.258
(2008) (arguing that an agency problem may lead lobbyists to oppose interest group mediation
mechanisms that might benefit their clients); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities
and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform,
73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 877–80 (1999) (arguing that the environmental groups that lobby policy-
makers have organizational interests that are separate from, and sometimes conflict with, the
interest in environmental protection, and that this explains their preference for centralized,
command-and-control regulation); David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American
Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights,
1943–1964 (Mar. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Journal on Legis-
lation) (suggesting that the organizational interests of mainstream civil rights groups influ-
enced these groups’ decisions to push for administrative, rather than legal, solutions to
employment discrimination problems in the 1940s and 1950s, despite evidence that a court-
centered strategy might be more effective).
8 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); John C. Coates IV, Explaining
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001); John C.
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Pri-
vate Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1986); John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Class Attorney as a Monitor in Share-
holder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985); James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E.
Speir, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Com-\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 4 19-JAN-10 8:57
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Just as puzzling patterns in litigation and settlement outcomes become more
easily explainable when one considers that lawyers are not always perfect
agents of their clients,9 so too might certain legislative outcomes become
more comprehensible when viewed in light of the fact that lobbyists are not
always perfect agents either.
This Essay explores the lobbyist-constituent agency problem and its im-
plications for public policy. The Essay draws on the scattered examples of
lobbyist-constituent agency problems in the existing literature, as well as
general principal-agent theory, to develop a more comprehensive account of
the causes and possible consequences of the lobbyist-constituent agency
problem for legislative outcomes. The Essay then advances four tentative
hypotheses as to the systematic effects that this agency problem may have
on public policy: (1) increased bias in favor of small homogenous interest
groups; (2) exacerbated status quo bias; (3) amplified legislative delegation
to administrative agencies; and (4) systematic impediments to reform.
The argument is limited in several ways. The lobbyist-constituent
agency problem does not provide a complete explanation for puzzling policy
choices any more than the lawyer-client agency problem provides a com-
plete account of litigation and settlement outcomes that do not seem com-
pletely consonant with the parties’ interests. Nor does this Essay aspire to
establish rigorously the existence or extent of the agency problem in any
particular context. Its goal—more modest, but nonetheless significant—is to
convince students of the policymaking process in the United States that they
should take the lobbyist-constituent agency problem at least as seriously as
students of litigation and negotiation treat the lawyer-client agency problem.
Consideration of the lobbyist-constituent agency problem should be a regu-
lar fixture, rather than an occasional afterthought, in analyses of pluralist
policymaking.
II. THE SOURCES OF THE LOBBYIST-CONSTITUENT AGENCY PROBLEM
Various entities and interest groups attempt to influence government
policymaking in pursuit of an extraordinarily diverse array of objectives.
Business firms want a favorable regulatory and tax environment that will
increase their profits. Members of the labor force want employment opportu-
pensation, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993); Winand Emons, Expertise, Contingent Fees, and
Insufficient Attorney Effort, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 21 (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert
H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litiga-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996); Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29 (1995); Thomas Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J.
LEGAL S TUD. 211 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests
of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165 (2003); Alison Watts, Bargaining
Through an Expert Attorney, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168 (1994).
9 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. R\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 5 19-JAN-10 8:57
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nities, high wages, and a safe working environment. Universities want gov-
ernment subsidies for academic research. Environmentalists want clean air
and water, as well as protection of endangered species and ecosystems. Vir-
tually all of these organized interest groups rely on professional lobbyists to
represent their interests.10
Public policy lobbying in the United States is a multi-billion dollar in-
dustry, and there are tens of thousands of lobbyists operating in Washington,
D.C. alone.11 Some organizations have their own in-house lobbyists, while
others employ “contract lobbyists”—typically public relations firms or law
firms.12 Some interest groups, particularly businesses, lobby through trade
associations, which are difficult to classify as either in-house or contract
lobbyists because the lobbyists are often employed directly by the associa-
tion, but the association consists of many members.13 Also, many organiza-
tions rely on a combination of in-house and contract lobbyists, just as some
companies may rely on a combination of in-house counsel and outside law
firms.14
These professional lobbyists perform a number of important services
for their clients. Most obviously, they advocate for their clients’ interests in
the policymaking process. In doing so, lobbyists make use of specialized
skills, including their expertise in navigating legislative and administrative
decision-making processes, their personal contacts and relationships with
key policymakers, and their ability to marshal and disseminate information
and arguments that put their clients’ preferred policies in the best possible
10 See JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS 22–30 (1996). For an online
database of lobbyists for interest groups and other entities, see the Center for Responsive
Politics compilation of lobbying reports filed with the Senate’s Office of Public Records.
Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.
php (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). In this Essay, the authors use the term “lobbyist” expansively
to cover not only individuals or entities that must register as lobbyists under the relevant
federal lobbying statutes, but also all those who are employed by interest groups to monitor
government activities, to formulate strategies to influence government behavior, and to advo-
cate on interest groups’ behalf before government bodies (including legislatures, administrative
agencies, and in some cases, courts). Thus this definition of lobbyists would include much of
the work of lawyers and other professionals, including consultants and public relations firms.
These findings would also be applicable to lobbying at other levels of government.
11 See ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL L OBBYING 12 (2006); WRIGHT, supra note 10, at R
9–11.
12 See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE 64–66 (1993); NOWNES, supra note 11, R
at 43.
13 For a useful discussion of trade associations, as well as an analysis of why firms might
sometimes prefer this mode of lobbying activity, see Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer,
Endogenous Trade Associations in Regulatory Politics (Oct. 15, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors).
14 For example, according to Center for Responsive Politics compilations, the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce retains in-house lobbyists and also hires outside lobbying firms. Center for
Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database—U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2009, http://
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=US+Chamber+of+Commerce&year=
2009 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 6 19-JAN-10 8:57
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light.15 In addition to their advocacy function, lobbyists monitor the legisla-
tive and administrative processes and provide their clients with information
about developments that are likely to affect the clients’ interests.16 Lobbyists
are a critical source of information not only because clients often do not
have the time or resources to do the monitoring themselves, but also because
a professional lobbyist’s familiarity with the policymaking process allows
them to be more efficient monitors of emerging issues and more accurate
predictors of the consequence of proposed reforms.17 The role of lobbyists as
monitors of the policy process is especially important for large membership
organizations and for more complex or arcane policy areas where individual
members have weak incentives to monitor the activities of the government
on their own.18
In addition to providing advocacy and monitoring services, lobbyists
also give their clients strategic advice about what policies to support and
how that advocacy should be undertaken.19 Indeed, one researcher reported
that when he asked a sample of industry executives what their top priorities
were in terms of federal health care policy, the most common answer was,
“Whatever our firm’s lobbyists say they are.”20 One well-known example of
how professional lobbyists can influence an interest group’s legislative strat-
egy is the automobile industry’s decision to support federal pollution control
standards in the 1960s, a policy that the industry had previously opposed.21
The suggested change in the auto industry’s strategy apparently came from
the prominent lawyer Lloyd Cutler, who advised his auto industry clients
that they would be better off with a federal statute that would preempt the
state anti-pollution statutes that were starting to appear.22 Just as Cutler’s
advice shaped the auto industry’s lobbying strategy on federal clean air legis-
lation, other lobbyists similarly shape their clients’ lobbying strategies by
recommending or discouraging different approaches. The lobbyists’ expertise
and experience makes it likely that their clients will pay close attention to
their advice. Moreover, in addition to their influence over general strategy,
15 See SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING I NTEREST G ROUPS 120–21 (2002); NOWNES,
supra note 11, at 16–19, 26–28; WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 88–113. R
16 See NOWNES, supra note 11, at 31–32, 44–46. R
17 See Robert H. Salisbury et al., Who You Know Versus What You Know: The Uses of
Government Experience for Washington Lobbyists, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 175 (1989) (discussing
value of lobbyist knowledge of substance policy and decision-making processes).
18 See Span, supra note 7, at 35. R
19 See id. at 51–52.
20 See Kersh, supra note 7, at 242; see also id. at 244–45 (noting that many lobbyists R
spend more time explaining issues to their clients than getting instructions from their clients
and that lobbyists are responsible for identifying many of their clients’ interests for them).
21 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER W ITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE T HROUGH DELEGATION 59 (1993); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 331
(1985).
22 SCHOENBROD, supra note 21, at 59. R\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 7 19-JAN-10 8:57
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many lobbyists have an enormous amount of de facto discretion over tactics,
including subtle decisions concerning levels of effort on different issues.23
The extent of various constituency groups’ reliance on professional lob-
byists for advocacy, for information, and for advice suggests at least the
possibility of an agency problem. Additionally, it is difficult and costly for
the client to monitor the lobbyist’s activities, including both the lobbyist’s
overall effort and the lobbyist’s specific tactical decisions. Although the cli-
ent may be able to observe a final policy outcome, it is difficult for the client
to disentangle how much of the final outcome is due to its lobbyist’s efforts
and how much of it is due to factors beyond the lobbyist’s control.24
Moreover, evaluating the impact of a policy outcome on the client’s
welfare involves a comparison between the actual outcome and one or more
unobserved counterfactuals. Even if the client is happy with the legislation
that Congress adopted, or happy that Congress did not adopt legislation, the
client does not know if it would have been even better off with a different
legislative outcome. Likewise, even when a policy outcome appears adverse
to the client’s interests, the lobbyist may often assert that it was the best
achievable result, and any alternative would have been even worse. Such
assertions are often, but not always, accurate, and it is difficult for a client to
identify those situations where the lobbyist is deliberately or subconsciously
bending the truth.
These agency problems are likely more acute for advocacy groups with
broad and diffuse membership than for single entities or narrower groups,
due to both the greater heterogeneity of underlying interests and greater
costs of monitoring the membership. Agency problems are also probably
more severe for organizations that rely on contract lobbyists than for organi-
zations that engage in direct lobbying because the potential divergence of
interest between a client and a contract lobbying firm is typically greater
than the divergence of interest between an organization and its in-house lob-
bying personnel. Further, it is probably also more costly to monitor behavior
in the former case.25 Likewise, the agency problem may be more serious
with regard to broad-based trade associations, whose interests may be imper-
fectly aligned with those of their members or whose members themselves
23 See Kersh, supra note 7, at 245. R
24 Cf. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks, Electoral Accountability and Incumbency, in
MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS 121 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989) (stating that it
is difficult to ascribe responsibility for any particular policy outcome to a particular legislator);
Scott Ashworth & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism
in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings, 68 J. POL. 168 (2006); John Ferejohn, Incum-
bent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUB. CHOICE 5 (1986); Susanne Lohmann, An
Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809 (1998).
25 See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 67. But see Kersh, supra note 7, at 254 n.9 (finding, R
in a sample of lobbyists, that the amount of lobbyist discretion seemed to depend on individual
characteristics of the lobbyists themselves, not on whether the lobbyists represent single firms
or larger associations, or on whether the lobbyists are in-house employees or outside “hired
guns”).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-JAN-10 8:57
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may have diverse or irreconcilable interests.26 Such problems mean that
there is likely to be some opportunity for lobbyists to exploit their informa-
tional advantages in ways that benefit the lobbyists more than their clients.
To be sure, lobbyists are constrained in a number of ways. Clients may
do what they can to monitor lobbyist activity.27 Clients may also try to de-
sign explicit or implicit incentive contracts to induce lobbyists to act as
faithful agents or to attract lobbyists who are likely to do so. For example,
clients can condition compensation (or repeat business) on results that
clearly benefit client interests.28 Also, the competitive market for lobbyists
might impose some discipline. Such market pressure might affect not only
for-profit lobbying firms, but also advocacy organizations that must compete
for members and donors.
Furthermore, lobbyists will often share their client’s underlying inter-
ests to a considerable degree. This is especially true when professional lob-
byists seek out a particular constituency or cause. For example, professionals
who lobby on behalf of environmental causes have a stronger-than-average
interest in environmental protection, as evidenced by the fact that they often
forego more lucrative employment opportunities.29 In addition, advocates
often come to internalize the values and interests of their clients and to see
things from their clients’ points of view.30
Nonetheless, it is likely that the congruence of lobbyist and client inter-
ests will often be imperfect. Four factors in particular may drive a wedge
between the goals of the lobbyist and the client. First, the lobbyist’s optimal
level of effort is likely to differ from what would benefit the client most.
This is because the lobbyist’s net compensation, both monetary and non-
monetary, is unlikely to correspond perfectly to the net benefits her services
confer on the client.31 In some cases, the marginal benefit to the client of an
additional unit of lobbyist effort exceeds the marginal benefit to the lobbyist
of investing that effort. In those cases, the lobbyist’s effort is likely to be
lower that what the client, if fully informed, would prefer.32 In other cases,
the marginal benefit to the client of an additional unit of effort is less than
26 For a recent, public example of such divergence, see Lisa Lerer, Nike to Quit Chamber
Post in Climate Protest, POLITICO, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/
27739.html.
27 See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 59–79; NOWNES, supra note 11, at 54–55. R
28 Thomas Susman & Margaret Martin, Contingent Fee Lobbying: Inflaming Avarice or
Facilitating Constitutional Rights, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 311 (2007).
29 See Roy, supra note 7, at 205. R
30 Cf. Alec Walen, Criticizing the Obligatory Acts of Lawyers: A Response to Markovits’s
Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 39 (2004) (noting
how lawyers may come to internalize their client’s perspective).
31 One contributing factor to this dynamic is that a lobbyist may have her own personal
policy preferences, and these may affect how hard the lobbyist works to pursue certain goals.
A lobbyist may have a stronger incentive to work hard if she agrees with the client’s goals than
if she does not. See Kersh, supra note 7, at 249–50. This may have public policy consequences R
with respect to particular issue areas that go beyond distortions in effort levels, but these
consequences are for the most part idiosyncratic.
32 Gillette, supra note 7, at 202. R\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 9 19-JAN-10 8:57
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the marginal benefit the lobbyist would receive. In those cases, the lobbyist’s
total effort is likely to be too high from the client’s perspective.33 Further-
more, precisely because certain aspects of lobbyist performance are easier to
observe than others, a lobbyist has an incentive to distort her efforts in the
direction of those activities that are more easily observable by the client,
even if other forms of subtler, difficult-to-observe effort would better ad-
vance the client’s underlying interests.34 Similarly, imperfect monitoring may
give a lobbyist an incentive to achieve easily observable short-term suc-
cesses that can be directly attributed to the lobbyist’s efforts and an incentive
to avoid easily observable defeats or more complicated strategies that may
advance the long term interests of the client but not generate immediate
payoffs.
The second reason that lobbyists’ incentives may not align perfectly
with their clients’ interests is that lobbyists have an interest in the long-term
value of their specific assets, the most important of which are expertise and
reputation.35 In many cases, a lobbyist’s interest in preserving the value of
her specific assets will overlap with the client’s interests in securing particu-
lar policy outcomes. A legislative victory, for example, both benefits the
client and burnishes the lobbyist’s reputation for reliability and efficacy.
Sometimes, however, a lobbyist’s interest in preserving the value of her
human capital or other specific assets will be in tension with the client’s
interests in particular policy outcomes or lobbying strategies. Perhaps more
importantly, some policy options that would benefit the client might also
render the lobbyist’s particular skills less valuable in the future, while other
options, though less desirable for the client, may increase demand for the
lobbyist’s services. In these cases, the lobbyist may be tempted, perhaps sub-
consciously, to give advice or advance arguments that serve the lobbyist’s
long-term self-interest more than they benefit the client.36
A third reason why lobbyists’ interests may diverge from the interests
of their clients is that the lobbyists themselves may have personal policy
interests that influence, at least at the margins, the sort of advice that lobby-
ists give to their clients. Further, these independent interests may influence
how lobbyists exercise the discretion they inevitably possess. Some lobby-
ists are drawn into the work precisely because they believe in a particular
cause; this dedication may sometimes lead to tension if the interests of a
particular client do not perfectly align with the lobbyist’s perception of what
33 Id.
34 That is, the lobbyist-client relationship may entail a multi-task moral hazard problem.
See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Con-
tracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991).
35 KEVIN W. HULA, LOBBYING T OGETHER: INTEREST GROUP COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE
POLITICS 95 (1999) (identifying reputation as an “important source of political capital”).
36 Cf. STEVE J OHN, THE PERSUADERS: WHEN LOBBYISTS MATTER 43 (2002) (noting the
importance of long-term relationships to lobbyists).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 10 19-JAN-10 8:57
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would be in the interest of the larger cause.37 Additionally, many lobbyists
have previously served with the government branch or agency that they are
now attempting to influence, and some harbor ambitions of returning to gov-
ernment service or, at least, seek to maintain close relationships with govern-
ment personnel.38 This may lead lobbyists, either out of instrumental career
concerns or subconscious identification, to see things from the perspective of
the relevant government agents, which may differ from the perspective of
the client.
Finally, professional lobbyists likely value good relations with other
lobbyists. This professional imperative may inhibit one lobbyist from ad-
vancing positions that modestly benefit the lobbyist’s own client if the posi-
tions would substantially harm the interests of clients of other lobbyists with
whom the first lobbyist hopes to work in the future. For example, imagine a
client with little capacity to benefit from congressional earmarks.39 It might
be in the client’s interest to support a categorical ban on earmarks, but the
client’s lobbyist may be reluctant to recommend or champion such a ban
because this action could antagonize other lobbyists and diminish the ability
of those lobbyists to obtain earmarks for their clients. Collegial relations
with fellow lobbyists is thus another form of human capital that may put
distance between the interests of lobbyists and those of their clients.
To be clear, this Essay does not argue that lobbyists engage in deliber-
ate subversion of their clients’ interests. Perhaps this sort of bad faith behav-
ior occurs sometimes, but it is likely uncommon. Far more plausible is that
lobbyists, like other human beings, have a tendency to believe that what is
good for their clients is what happens to be good for them as well. Thus even
when lobbyists act entirely in good faith, their self-interest may cloud or
distort their judgment of what would best serve their clients’ interests.40 The
question then becomes whether this distortion has systematic consequences
for public policy.
37 Cf. Bell, supra note 8 (making the analogous point with respect to public interest R
lawyers).
38 This implies that, insofar as government entities have their own institutional interests,
which do not necessarily reflect the interests of their various constituencies or the general
public, lobbyists who sympathize or identify with these entities may “inherit” some of their
particular institutional interests. These inherited preferences, in turn, may sometimes diverge
from the interests of lobbyists’ clients.
39 For an overview of federal earmarks, see Robert Porter & Sam Walsh, Earmarks in the
Federal Budget Process (Apr. 1, 2008) (unpublished student paper), available at http://www.
law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/budget.php).
40 See Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physi-
cians from Industry, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252 (2003); Don A. Moore & George Loewen-
stein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES.
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOBBYIST-CONSTITUENT AGENCY
PROBLEM FOR THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The fact that lobbyists are imperfect agents may mean that their clients
overpay for lobbying services. Because the value of a lobbyist’s services is
difficult to measure, a client may pay premium rates for what may be subop-
timal effort on the lobbyist’s part. This may be a socially undesirable dead-
weight cost, although that normative conclusion is debatable. This Essay,
however, is not particularly interested in this sort of “over-billing” problem.
Rather, it focuses on whether the lobbyist-constituent agency problem leads
to public policy decisions that differ systematically from what one would
expect in a “pure” pluralist system. While the impact of the lobbyist-constit-
uent agency problem on public policy is likely to depend on context, this
Essay advances four tentative hypotheses about the systematic effects that
this agency problem is likely to have on legislative outcomes. These hypoth-
eses are admittedly speculative, based principally on extrapolations from
principal-agent theory and plausible, though contestable, assumptions about
lobbyist interests and the nature of the legislative process. Rigorous empiri-
cal scrutiny to test these and other hypotheses is left to future work, with the
recognition that empirical validation of these theories will pose considerable
challenges, as it will often be difficult to identify cases where the actions of
lobbyists are irrefutably in conflict with the interests of their clients.41
A. Hypothesis #1: The Lobbyist-Constituent Agency
Problem Exacerbates Power Asymmetries Between
Concentrated and Diffuse Interests
A standard argument in the literature on interest group pluralism is that
small, concentrated, homogenous groups have an advantage over large, dif-
fuse, heterogeneous groups because it is easier for smaller groups to over-
come collective action problems and to mobilize members to advance the
41 Actions in blatant conflict with client interests would usually be easily observable at the
time of the lobbying and thus subject to direct principal control. In closer cases, there will
often be plausible arguments that the interests of lobbyists and clients are aligned in most
material respects. In addition, even when a lobbyist’s position clearly did not serve a client’s
interests in retrospect, it is always possible that the position was taken in error and with the
client’s express and knowing acquiescence. There are, however, some cases where the totality
of circumstances suggests that at least some lobbyists are not pursuing client interests. For
example, during the Clinton Administration, the Treasury Department proposed the creation of
a new council of financial regulators to resolve inter-agency disputes. The proposal was op-
posed by nearly every financial services lobbying group on the grounds that the council would
disadvantage the interests of each client group. See Dean Anason, Financial Council’s Power,
Scope, Makeup Criticized, AM. BANKER, June 27, 1997, at 3. While the proposal would have
undoubtedly shifted the nexus of regulatory powers, it seems implausible that every group
(many of which had diametrically opposed economic interests) would have been injured by the
proposed reforms. It is more likely that the lobbyists were reflexively steering their clients
away from a new and unfamiliar regulatory structure.\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 12 19-JAN-10 8:57
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group’s interests.42 The agency problem identified in this Essay may exacer-
bate this power asymmetry. As it becomes more difficult for the client-prin-
cipals to monitor lobbyist-agents, the more likely it is that the lobbyists will
“shirk,” making insufficiently vigorous efforts on the principals’ behalves or
pursuing results that do not quite match the principals’ goals.
Single entities or small concentrated groups are likely to be better able
to monitor their lobbyist-agents than large, diffuse groups. Trade associa-
tions may present a similar monitoring problem for their members, both be-
cause heterogeneity of membership implies heterogeneity of interests and
because a large membership organization will confront a greater free-rider
problem with respect to monitoring. The benefit of this is that concentrated
interest groups are likely to get more lobbyist “bang for their buck” than
large heterogeneous groups.43 This gives concentrated interest groups an ad-
ditional advantage in the legislative process. This advantage may persist
even if large, diffuse groups find a way to overcome the initial collective
action problem by agreeing to contribute to a broad-based membership
organization.44
B. Hypothesis #2: The Lobbyist-Constituent Agency Problem
Leads to an Excessive Focus on Symbolic Issues and
Insufficient Clarification of Problematic Issues
As Part II noted, constituents often rely on their lobbyists for informa-
tion and advice about which issues they should be concerned about and
where they should invest their resources in attempting to influence the legis-
lative process. Lobbyist and client interests may align to a considerable de-
42 See OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 3; OLSON, THE RISE AND R
DECLINE OF NATIONS, supra note 3. R
43 A possible example here would be the prominent role that the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce has taken in opposing the Obama administration’s proposal to create a Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Agency. See Perspectives on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Andrew
J. Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/
financialsvcs_dem/pincus_-_chamber.pdf. While some aspects of the proposed legislation may
have created concerns for certain segments of the Chamber’s membership, the group’s whole-
sale and well-funded attack on many aspects of the administration’s proposal—including pro-
visions aimed primarily at regulated banks—seems unlikely to have been the kind of
governmental action that would have been a major concern to the Chamber’s hundreds of
thousands of business and organizational members. See also Lisa Lerer, White House Plan:
Neuter the Chamber, POLITICO, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/
28445.html (chronicling disputes between the Obama administration and the Chamber of
Commerce on financial regulatory reform and other issues).
44 As Part II suggests, the agency problem might sometimes lead a lobbyist to exert more
effort than the principal desires. For example, high-profile lobbying successes may confer pri-
vate benefits on the lobbyists themselves, such as personal satisfaction or future employment
opportunities. In these cases, one might observe an opposite asymmetry in which large, diffuse
groups lobby more aggressively. Even though this increases the odds that these lobbying ef-
forts will be successful, the result is still a welfare loss for the principals, who, if fully in-
formed, would have allocated their resources differently.\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-JAN-10 8:57
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gree when it comes to identifying major issues of concern because lobbyists
want to develop a reputation for spotting important issues early and for deal-
ing with them effectively. Nevertheless, these interests may diverge in sys-
tematic ways. For example, lobbyists may have an excessive incentive to
identify issues where the potential rewards for the lobbyist appear to be high,
even when they are not as high for the client. As a result, lobbyists may
sometimes have a strong incentive to make mountains out of molehills: a
lobbyist can benefit from making small issues seem significant if the lobby-
ist anticipates a high probability that lobbying on those issues will produce a
positive (or apparently positive) outcome.45 Because the client cannot ascer-
tain how much of the credit for success is due to the lobbyist’s ability and
how much is due to external circumstances, the lobbyist has an incentive to
seek out, and exaggerate the importance of, issues on which the lobbyist
anticipates an easy victory. This suggests an excessive attention to relatively
minor issues and symbolic victories, perhaps at the expense of more signifi-
cant problems.46
The inverse problem may also arise. In an environment of incomplete
information, a client may not be able to disentangle how much of the failure
was due to the lobbyist’s lack of ability and how much was due to factors
outside the lobbyist’s control.47 That means an obvious legislative defeat will
cause the client rationally to downgrade its assessment of the lobbyist’s per-
formance. A lobbyist may therefore have an incentive to avoid calling its
clients’ attention to issues and problems that affect the client’s interests, but
where the lobbyist anticipates there is a good chance of losing. Lobbyists, in
other words, may sometimes have incentives to make molehills out of moun-
tains: by minimizing the significance of certain issues, the lobbyist may try
to avoid blame for defeat, even if the client would have been better off by
raising and confronting the issue. This problem likely occurs less frequently
45 See Kersh, supra note 7, at 248–49 (noting that lobbyists can generate more business by R
convincing clients to pay attention to issues the clients had previously ignored or were una-
ware of than by merely completing an assignment and waiting for repeat business).
46 For example, when federal banking agencies began to focus on the potential problem of
mortgage underwriting several years ago, the Mortgage Bankers Association (“MBA”) and
many other financial services industry lobbying groups opposed the effort, defending the ad-
justable rate mortgages as “tried and true credit options” that “helped millions achieve the
dream of home ownership.” See Letter from John Robbins, Chairman, MBA, to Sen. Chris
Dodd (D-Conn.), Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs (Jan. 8, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Advocacy/TestimonyandCommentLeters/MBA
Letter_NewGuidanceonNonTraditionalMortgageProductRisk_1-8-2007.pdf. These efforts suc-
ceeded in the short-term by diluting the severity of banking agency initiatives, but in retrospect
the success did not advance the longer-term interests of the MBA’s membership, which suf-
fered greatly when the housing market burst shortly thereafter. A more nuanced approach to
the emerging problem of mortgage underwriting might have better protected the interests of
MBA members but would have been politically risky for groups like the MBA and therefore
arguably less attractive ex ante.
47 An extensive literature has considered the analogous problem in the context of electoral
control of politicians, where the voter may be uncertain how much of the observed outcome is
due to the politician’s efforts and how much is due to factors beyond the politician’s control.
Austen-Smith & Banks, supra note 24, at 121. R\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-JAN-10 8:57
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than the tendency to exaggerate small problems, perhaps because it is more
difficult for a lobbyist to downplay an issue that is obviously important to an
interest group’s members.
Sometimes, of course, important issues cannot be ignored. Their sali-
ence is too obvious, and any attempt by a lobbyist to downplay the signifi-
cance of the issue would backfire. Nonetheless, lobbyists’ interests in
securing apparent victories and in avoiding obvious defeats may lead them
to deal with these issues in ways that do not force resolution of the issues as
fully as their clients, if completely informed, would prefer. The prevalence
of vague legislative language may be one manifestation of this phenomenon.
Imprecise or incomplete statutory language is sometimes explained by legis-
lators’ interests in avoiding difficult choices. It also may be explained by a
legislator’s desire to claim to a diverse set of competing interest groups that
the legislation benefits them.48 While this explanation is logical, it raises a
puzzle: why do interest groups fall for this strategy? Why do they not de-
mand greater legislative clarity, if it would be to their advantage?49
The lobbyist-constituent agency problem suggests a partial answer.
Lobbyists on all sides of a contested issue may benefit from imprecise or
incomplete statutes, which allow them to claim victory on behalf of their
clients, or at least to avoid the appearance of a clear-cut defeat. They may
therefore have little incentive to point out ambiguities and potential
problems. The strategy of legislative vagueness is puzzling only if one as-
sumes that interest groups recognize both that vagueness exists and that they
would benefit from an attempt to force greater clarity. Yet, if the interest
groups rely for information and advice on lobbyists who may share the legis-
lators’ interest in short-term evasion of difficult problems, there will likely
be more opportunities for this evasion to occur.
One consequence of these problems may be a particular form of status
quo bias. It is much easier for a lobbyist to successfully block a legislative
initiative than to secure its enactment.50 Thus, lobbyists interested in achiev-
48 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 21, at 59; Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative R
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7, 56–62 (1982–83); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice
of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46–52
(1982); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judici-
ary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine
of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 349, 361–66 (1993).
49 See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING P OWERS (1999); JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,  AND G OVERNANCE 145–48 (1997); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
50 This bias is built into the structure of federal government, where enactment of legisla-
tion typically requires favorable referral of legislative proposals by the relevant committees to
the parent chambers, reconciliation of any differences between House and Senate versions, the
affirmative vote of both chambers, plus a presidential signature (or the two-thirds supermajori-
ties in each chamber necessary to overcome a presidential veto). This makes it relatively easier
to block than to enact legislation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The
Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528–33 (1992); Roberta Romano, The Political
Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997).\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 15 19-JAN-10 8:57
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ing visible successes and avoiding visible defeats have an incentive to em-
phasize the importance of blocking alleged threats to client interests and to
downplay the importance of securing affirmative policy change. Only the
most sophisticated clients are likely to be aware of these incentives, and
even they are often over-reliant on lobbyists for strategic and tactical advice.
By contrast, clients with less expertise in legislative affairs may be wholly
unaware of lobbyist incentives. The lobbyist-constituent agency problem
may therefore exacerbate the status quo bias already built into the legislative
process.
C. Hypothesis #3: The Lobbyist-Constituent Agency Problem Creates an
Excessive Incentive to Delegate to Administrative Agencies
The lobbyist-constituent agency problem may produce an excessive
tendency not only to enact vague or symbolic legislation, but also to delegate
decision-making authority to administrative agencies. The prevalence of del-
egation to agencies is well known and much debated.51 Some amount of
delegation may be inevitable, as it is impossible to foresee all the issues that
may arise when an executive agency attempts to implement a general law.52
Yet, the amount of delegation to agencies, including frequent delegation of
what can only be described as lawmaking power, suggests that something
more than technical necessity is driving the expansion of administrative
governance.
Scholars have suggested myriad explanations for the legislative ten-
dency to delegate. Some scholars accentuate the positive effects of delega-
tion by focusing on technical expertise and healthy insulation from partisan
politics.53 Others, who are more critical, emphasize legislative slack and
avoidance of responsibility.54 Without directly engaging these hypotheses,
this Essay suggests that the lobbyist-constituent agency problem may induce
more frequent and expansive delegations than would be observed if lobby-
ists were perfect representatives of their clients. If so, the current type and
amount of delegation may be excessive from the pluralist point of view.
There are two reasons that the lobbyist-constituent agency problem may
produce a stronger tendency to delegate important policy decisions to admin-
istrative agencies. First, as discussed above, the lobbyist-constituent agency
problem may produce an excessive tendency to pass ambiguous or incom-
51 See, e.g., Aranson et al., supra note 48, at 7–21. R
52 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation: In the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983).
53 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE A DMINISTRATIVE P ROCESS (1938); Jonathan Bendor &
Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293 (2004); David
Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A
Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947 (1999); David B. Spence & Frank
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000–01).
54 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 21, at 59; Aranson et al., supra note 48, at 7, 56–62; R
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plete statutes: the lobbyist can portray the result as a victory to the (incom-
pletely informed) client, or at least can take satisfaction in the fact that the
result is unlikely to be considered a defeat. Second, delegation to an agency
may enhance demand for the lobbyist’s services. If a professional lobbying
firm or advocacy group has expertise in lobbying both the relevant adminis-
trative agency and the legislature—as is often the case55—then delegation to
that agency means that the constituent is likely to retain the lobbyist’s ser-
vices after the legislation is passed. Moreover, to the extent that the lobbyist
identifies with the interests of the agency, the lobbyist may be biased in
favor of expanding the scope of the agency’s authority. Although the client
might sometimes prefer delegation, there may be cases when the client, if
fully informed, would have preferred a legislative resolution, but where the
lobbyist preferred to leave it to the administrative process because the cumu-
lative demand for the lobbyist’s services will be higher.56
Delegation to an agency may also create more demand for legislative
lobbying. As many political scientists have observed, delegating the resolu-
tion of an issue to an administrative agency does not eliminate the role of the
legislature in addressing that issue because of the importance of legislative
oversight in influencing administrative decision-making.57 Indeed, some po-
litical scientists have suggested that Congress deliberately designs agencies
to be inefficient—or, in a softer variant on the same idea, that Congress has
insufficient incentives to invest substantial effort into making agencies more
efficient—because an inefficient regulatory process creates more opportuni-
55 See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 95–98 (finding that many of the lobbyists who R
participate regularly in lobbying Congress also represent their clients before executive branch
agencies).
56 A possible example of this phenomenon can be seen in a provision of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which expanded the powers of banks to engage in securities activi-
ties but left unresolved the appropriate degree of Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) oversight of bank securities activities. This left the issue of oversight to the joint
resolution of the SEC and the banking agencies. The agencies then spent seven full years
implementing new regulations in this area, failing to reach a final decision until Congress
adopted another piece of legislation mandating adoption of regulation by September 2007. See
Definitions of Terms and Exemptions Relating to the “Broker” Exception for Banks, 72 Fed.
Reg. 56,514 (Oct. 3, 2007) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R. pt. 218 and 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 247).
57 See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT (1990); Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional
Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995); David Epstein &
Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 697 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Pol-
icy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 481
(1989); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Con-
gressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165
(1984); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Con-
trol? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765
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ties for legislators to intercede on behalf of particular constituents.58 In other
words, credit for efficient legislation is dispersed throughout the legislature,
but an individual legislator can take full credit for a particular intervention
with an agency on a constituent’s behalf. This intriguing hypothesis has diffi-
culty, however, accounting for why interest groups, particularly sophisti-
cated interest groups, are willing to accept this. After all, if a sophisticated
interest group recognized that an agency’s decision-making process were
inefficient, it could lobby legislators in each chamber to introduce a regula-
tory reform bill and observe which legislators voted for or against it. Interest
groups, however, may not be good at identifying how or why an administra-
tive process is inefficient, nor may they be particularly good at determining
which legislative proposal, if any, might redress the problem. These groups
necessarily rely on their lobbyists for information and advice.
The lobbyists, like the legislators, may benefit more from a “casework”
system, in which aggrieved constituents frequently seek assistance from leg-
islative overseers to deal with their regulatory difficulties. Therefore, in an
environment where monitoring and disciplining lobbyists is imperfect, the
lobbyists and legislators may share an interest in preserving a “casework”-
oriented system, and the lobbyist-constituent agency problem may contribute
to the maintenance of that system.
D. Hypothesis #4: The Lobbyist-Constituent Agency Problem Promotes
Excessive Opposition to Reforms of Decision-Making Processes
One of the most important possible consequences of the lobbyist-con-
stituent agency problem is that it may produce an excessive status quo bias
with respect to decision-making structures and processes. Professional lob-
byists have typically invested substantial resources in cultivating the exper-
tise, contacts, and relationships that enable them to represent their clients
effectively within the existing system. Situations may arise in which the cli-
ent would benefit from a substantial change to the existing decision-making
process. The client’s lobbyist, however, might anticipate that such a change
would substantially reduce the value of the lobbyist’s specific assets. As a
result, the lobbyist might obscure or deemphasize the possibility of such a
change. The lobbyist might simply fail to raise it as a possibility, might try to
convince the client that it is a bad idea, or might press for it with insufficient
effort.
Consider, as a hypothetical example, a proposal to transfer authority
over a given industry from a specialized commission to a larger agency with
more general regulatory authority. This transfer might benefit firms in the
industry for any number of reasons, including greater efficiency and coordi-
nation, more professionalism and competence on the part of the regulators in
58 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE W ASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
46–49, 71 (1977); Fiorina, supra note 48, at 46–52. R\\server05\productn\H\HLL\47-1\HLL101.txt unknown Seq: 18 19-JAN-10 8:57
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the general agency, and so forth. However, the lobbyist for the industry’s
trade association may have developed distinctive expertise in dealing with
the specialized agency—she has established relationships with the commis-
sioners, she is familiar with the internal decision-making processes, she
knows the regulatory pressure points, and so forth. The value of this exper-
tise would be diminished if the specialized agency were absorbed into a
larger, more generalized agency. The client would still need a representative
before the general agency, but there is no guarantee that the client would use
the same lobbyist that previously represented it before the specialized
agency. As a result, the current lobbyist might oppose the change, even if it
would benefit the client.59 The same logic applies in the inverse situation,
where there is a proposal to transfer authority over a given industry from a
general agency to a new specialized agency. Furthermore, if lobbyists iden-
tify with particular government agencies—perhaps because of past employ-
ment—or seek to curry favor with them—perhaps because of anticipated
future employment opportunities—these lobbyists may be reluctant to push
proposals that are adverse to the agency’s interests, including its interest in
self-preservation.
By similar logic, the lobbyist-constituent agency problem may engen-
der an excessive reluctance, or, in some cases, an excessive enthusiasm, for
changing the principal locus of government decision-making from the fed-
eral government to individual states, or vice versa. Consider, for example, a
trade association or advocacy group that is represented by lobbyists who
specialize in dealing with Congress and the federal regulatory agencies.
These lobbyists are likely to have the expertise and personal contacts that are
useful in representing clients’ interests in these federal venues. The lobbyists’
assets are probably much less useful in pressing their clients’ interests before
a state legislature or agency. For this reason, these lobbyists might be
unenthusiastic about legislative proposals to devolve more regulatory au-
thority to state and local governments, even if doing so would have expected
benefits for their clients.60
59 The ongoing debates over regulatory reform in the financial services industry offer
many possible illustrations of this phenomenon, as many trade groups oppose consolidation of
financial supervision in the United States. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINAN-
CIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE
THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009) (including comments from the
American Bankers Association), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf.
60 Again the on-going financial regulatory reform debates offer possible examples. One of
the most contentious aspects of the Obama administration’s proposals for consumer protection
is the restoration of state supervisory authority of federally chartered depository institutions,
such as national banks or federally chartered thrifts. Lobbyists for the financial services indus-
try have generally opposed this aspect of the administration’s proposals, preferring to maintain
uniform national standards. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Bartlett, President and CEO, The Fin.
Servs. Roundtable, to Members of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (July 8,
2009), available at http://www.fsround.org/policy/pstatements/pdfs/FSRReg.REformLtrtoSen
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The same phenomenon may apply in reverse for lobbyists who special-
ize in representing clients before state governments. These lobbyists may be
excessively hostile to the federalization of issues that have previously been
handled at the state level. For example, most major corporations are incorpo-
rated in Delaware.61 As a result, professional lobbyists who act on behalf of
the managers and shareholders of these corporations have developed a spe-
cial expertise in representing their clients in the Delaware legislature, which
has proved quite responsive to their input.62 These specialized lobbyists may
therefore have self-interested reasons for opposing, and advising their clients
to oppose, greater federalization of corporate law, even in contexts where
their clients might benefit.
Finally, this same basic logic may promote excessive reluctance to
drastically alter the government’s regulatory strategy. For example, switch-
ing from a “command-and-control” system of regulation, where government
agencies play a large role in allocating resources, to a more market-based
system might dramatically reduce the value of the specialized expertise of
those who only know how to work the existing governmental system. This is
not necessarily because the aggregate demand for lobbying services would
be lower under a market-based system than under a command-and-control
system, though it might be in some cases. The more important consequence
is that the shift in regulatory strategy alters the type and nature of expertise
that would be valuable to clients, and such changes are therefore threatening
to incumbent lobbyists.
Legislative observers generally acknowledge that there is a status quo
bias in the legislative process, which can be explained without necessarily
invoking a lobbyist-client agency problem. That said, the agency problem
may not only exacerbate the status quo bias problem, it may also make the
problem especially acute in particular contexts. The lobbyist-client agency
problem may partly explain why the bias persists even in contexts where a
large coalition of interests would seem to benefit from change. Additionally,
while this Essay has emphasized ways in which the agency problem may
promote excessive opposition to reforms of decision-making processes, the
underlying logic of the argument suggests particular situations in which ob-
servers might notice an excessive enthusiasm for certain types of changes.
Where, for example, lobbyists anticipate that a process reform would en-
hance the value of their specialized assets, they may push for it with enthusi-
asm, even if the benefits to their clients are questionable. Similarly, just as
lobbyists may have an excessive taste to delegate to agencies, they may also
have an excessive taste for complex procedures, as these create greater
61 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Half-Life, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript
at 1, on file with authors).
62 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buy-
ing an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan and Kamar’s Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1268–70
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ongoing demand for lobbyists’ services. This may produce not only a resis-
tance to simplification, but also an enthusiasm for greater complexity than
various constituencies’ interests would warrant.
Again, the point is not that an interest group’s opposition to a change in
government decision-making processes, or enthusiasm for delegation to
agencies, necessarily arises from an agency problem between the interest
group and its lobbyists. In most cases, lobbyists will likely advance positions
that do in fact favor their clients’ interests. The argument is that there may be
a subset of cases at the margin where the lobbyist-constituent agency prob-
lem distorts an interest group’s behavior in systematic ways.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay has suggested that incomplete information and imperfect
monitoring may create a principal-agent problem between lobbyists and the
constituencies they represent and advise. It has further suggested that this
agency problem may create or intensify systematic distortions in the poli-
cymaking process. The lobbyist-constituent agency problem may increase
the relative advantages that small, homogenous, concentrated groups already
enjoy, as these groups are better able to monitor their lobbyist-agents and
reduce agency slack. This agency problem may also engender an overem-
phasis on small issues and symbolic legislation, as well as vague or incom-
plete legislation on more important issues. Perhaps most importantly, the
lobbyist-constituent agency problem may promote excessive delegation to
administrative agencies and an excessive preference for decision-making
structures and processes that benefit incumbent lobbyists. This latter effect
will usually, though perhaps not always, inhibit programs of structural re-
form that reshape government operations.
These hypotheses are general, abstract, and tentative. While they are
plausible conjectures about the impact of a lobbyist-constituent agency prob-
lem on public policy outcomes, both the extent and implications of this
agency problem are likely to vary by context and be easily generalized. The
central objective of this Essay is not to demonstrate the accuracy of any of
these particular hypotheses, but rather to identify the lobbyist-constituent
agency problem as a potentially important influence on public policy out-
comes—an influence that might systematically distort the outcomes of a plu-
ralist policymaking process away from what one would otherwise expect.